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Abstract 
 Utilizing the proprietary data of a company operating 10 pawnshops throughout 
Kentucky and Ohio, and exploiting the randomized variation of the Economic Stimulus 
Payments of 2008, this paper studies the effect of positive liquidity shocks on pawn loan 
utilization. We uncover a statistically significant 67% decrease in pawn loan utilization in the 
week following receipt of ESP checks. However, in the year following receipt of the ESP via 
check or direct deposit, a statistically significant increase of 20% and 138% respectively in pawn 
loan utilization occurs. A distributed lag regression model corroborates this effect— an initial 
decrease, but then dominating increase in pawn loan utilization following receipt of an ESP. This 
propensity of short term, transitory changes in income to drastically affect the borrowing patterns 
of households proves difficult to reconcile with Permanent Income/Life Cycle Hypothesis. 
 
Keywords: Liquidity Constraints, Pawnbroking, Permanent Income Hypothesis, Stimulus, Fringe 
Banking 
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1. Introduction 
 The project concerns itself with random sources of variation in the pawn industry that 
may present relevant findings for the field of behavioral economics. In particular, the project 
explores the impact of liquidity shocks on pawn loan demand. The project asks the following 
question: what impact do positive liquidity shocks (i.e. the Economic Stimulus act of 2008) have 
on the pawn loan utilization of pawn customers?  
2. Background on Positive Liquidity Shocks 
 The project studies the effect of the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 on the demand for 
pawn loans. In order to do this, the project exploits the randomized disbursement schedule of the 
policy. Specifically, according to the last two digits of individuals’ social security numbers, the 
timing of the sending of Economic Stimulus Payments was determined. For instance, in the case 
of the 2008 Economic Stimulus Payments, the ESPs of the first SSN group (00-09) were sent via 
check on May 16, the second SSN group (10-18) on May 23, and the last (88-99) on July 11. 
Thanks to the data of the company studied including the SSNs of its customers, the project is 
able to explore and measure the effect of the timing of payments on the amount of pawn loan 
debt outstanding for each SSN group. Given that the last two digits of SSNs are randomly 
assigned, the only source of variation between these SSN groups would seem to be when these 
groups received their ESPs. Given the date of ESP receipt is known for each SSN two-digit pair 
(Figure 1), the project is able to compare the behavior of those individuals who received their 
ESP in a given week to those who did not. This allows the project to isolate and characterize the 
effect of a positive liquidity shock on pawn loan utilization.  
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Many of these pawn customers ostensibly received these tax rebates and stimulus 
payments. That is, households received either of these payments if they possessed qualifying 
income (including Social Security income) in the previous year. These payments were as little as 
$300-600 for single people and $600-$1200 for couples. Moreover, the stimulus payments 
awarded households $300 for each of their children. Given the per-child credit, payments for 
households ranged from $300 to over $3000 (Parker, Souleles, Johnson, and McClelland  2011).  
These payments are on the same order of the average loan size. Therefore, the project speculates, 
agnostic to direction and magnitude, that these liquidity injections must have some effect on 
pawn loan demand. Evidence of such an effect would be quite difficult to reconcile with the 
Permanent Income/Life Cycle Hypothesis and models of consumption smoothing.  
2.1 Literature Review 
 The project studies the effect of the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 on the demand for 
pawn loans. Most subsequent analysis has focused on the policies’ aggregate consumption and 
savings ramifications (Shapiro and Slemrod 2009; Parker et al. 2011).The literature relevant to 
the project is comprised of that literature pertaining specifically to the 2008 Economic Stimulus 
Payments’ effect on household consumption and that pertaining more generally to the industry of 
pawn lending. Never before has the effect of the 2008 ESPs on pawn lending been studied. This 
literature review seeks to explore the relevant union between the existing thought in these 
disconnected fields.  
Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 
 Kaplan and Violante (2013) find that approximately 25 percent of fiscal stimulus 
payments, specifically the 2001 tax rebates, are spent on nondurable household consumption in 
the quarter that they are received. These households display large propensities to consume out of 
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additional and temporary changes to income, and small propensities to consume out of news 
about future income.  
 Broda and Parker (2008) found preliminary evidence that the 2008 Economic Stimulus 
Payments prompted households to perform an appreciable amount of extra spending. This extra 
spending was evidenced in a 3.5% greater expenditure toward food, mass-merchandise, and drug 
products. Broda and Parker were led to estimate that the demand for overall nondurable 
consumption in the second quarter of 2008 was boosted by 2.4% as a direct result of the ESPs. 
Moreover, they found it to be the case that low income and low asset households were much 
more responsive to the receipt of ESPs. Specifically, low income and low asset households 
increased their spending at nearly double the rate of the average household. Still yet, most people 
reported that the use of their ESPs was dedicated to purchase durable goods and personal 
services rather than groceries or apparel. All of these findings underscored the potency of ESPs 
as a way of stabilizing consumer spending. 
 Broda and Parker (2014) found that the week after receipt of the ESP a household’s 
spending increased by an average of 10% which cumulates to a total of 1.5-3.8 percent of 
spending over three months. This spending was concentrated among households with low past 
income and low wealth. Moreover, they found no significant increase when households learned 
that they would be receiving an ESP. This is hard to reconcile with the PIH.  
 Shapiro and Slemrod (2012) challenged, or at the very least weakened, Broda and 
Parker’s characterization of the ESPs. Using the University of Michigan Survey Research 
Center’s Monthly Survey, they found that only one-fifth of survey respondents said the ESPs 
would lead them to increase spending. Rather, respondents held that the ESP would be mostly 
used to pay off debt. This implies that the marginal propensity to consume given receipt of the 
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ESPs was about one-third and, as a lag effect, there would not be a terrific increase in 
consumption. This said, there was a noticeable effect on the timing of GDP such that growth in 
the second quarter was stronger and growth in the third quarter was weaker than would have 
been expected absent the rebates. Though these ESPs may improve consumer wellbeing, it does 
not necessarily motivate them to spend. The authors speculate that during this time period, given 
a serious shock to wealth, most households were focused on rebuilding their personal balance 
sheets. Summarily speaking, Shapiro and Slemrod remind policymakers to understand that ESPs 
may not actually be spent and therefore may not be very stimulating. 
 Parker, Souleles, Johnson, and McClelland (2011) studied the effect of the 2008 ESPs 
using questions added to the Consumer Expenditure Survey and the randomized timing of ESP 
receipt given the last two-digits of recipients Social Security Numbers. They found that, on 
average, households spent 12-30% of their stimulus payments on nondurable expenditures within 
the three-month period during which those payments were received. Moreover, there was a 
substantial and significant increase in purchases of durable goods. Specifically, there existed a 
particularly large increase in the purchase of vehicles. Adding in purchases of durable goods, the 
average total spending response to ESP receipt totaled about 50-90% of payments. They find 
also that propensity to consume varies little with whether ESPs were received via check or direct 
deposit. About 40% were given their checks via direct deposit.  
 Sahm, Shapiro, and Slemrod (2012) found that the one-time payment in the form of an 
ESP has twice the effect in propensity to consume than does a decrease in the amount of 
withholding. About six months after receipt of the ESP 25% of households reported they mostly 
spent the money that was sent to them in the form of an ESP. 
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 Powell (2014) shifted the focus from the effect on short-term consumer spending of tax 
rebates and ESPs to the effects on household labor supply. Exploiting the randomized timing of 
the 2008 stimulus payments and examining changes in household labor earnings as reported in 
the Survey of Income and Program Participation, paying particular attention to the disuniformity 
of effects across the income spectrum, the author found that ESP receipt has significant effects 
on labor supply. Specifically, households are more likely to decrease their supply of labor hours 
in those weeks following receipt of the ESP. These effects were even more pronounced for single 
women, married couples, and hourly workers. The evidence is strongest for those households 
that used the rebate to reduce their debt, suggesting that those individuals in those households are 
liquidity constrained and an important source of the overall effect. 
 Gross and Tobacman's “Dangerous Liquidity and the Demand for Health Care” sets the 
ground for this paper’s exploration of the effect of the 2001 tax rebate and the 2008 stimulus 
payment. Rather than explore the effect these transfers have on pawn loan demand, Gross and 
Tobacman focused instead on their impact on hospitalization and health care utilization. Their 
project found that payments raised the probability of an adult emergency department visit over 
the following 23 weeks by an average of 1.1%. These findings prove rather difficult to reconcile 
with the PIH. 
Pawnbroking 
 Pawnbroking is the world's oldest source of credit. Today, 7% of all U.S. households 
have used pawn credit (Carter, Skiba 2012). However, though pawn lending predates the Bible, 
and though it proves so pervasive in today's society, economists know very little about this form 
of banking and its customers. Historically, fringe banking as a whole has not been the 
beneficiary of much research done in this area. To illustrate, consider the case of John P. 
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Caskey's seminal 1996 book on the subject, Fringe Banking. When it was written, Caskey 
described it as the first piece of economic research done on the topic of pawn shops in 30 years. 
Since it was written, it, at least according to Google Scholar, has been cited 332 times. This said, 
the lion’s share of such citations belong to sociological and ethnographic studies seeking to 
describe the financial lives of the urban poor. Those economists who have sought to seriously 
consider the subject of pawnbroking and other fringe banking institutions could at most fill half 
of a small classroom.  
To define a term which many may only know through such televisions shows as 
Hardcore Pawn and Pawn Stars, pawn loans are short term collateralized loans, rarely more than 
a few hundred dollars, typically used by low-income consumers. If the borrower fails to repay 
the principal or interest within a given period of time, the borrower forfeits the item to the store. 
The store then resells the item. Pawn proves appealing to so many of the socioeconomically 
disadvantaged because nearly anyone can borrow on a pawn loan. All that is required is the 
collateral and a photo ID. The issue of consumption smoothing remains fairly untouched in the 
limited literature of pawnshop lending. This is especially shocking in light of similar research on 
similar non-traditional credit institutions collectively referred to as fringe banking. Such fringe 
banking services include subprime mortgages, subprime auto loans, car title loans, payday loans, 
and check cashing.  
“Pawnshops, Behavioral Economics, and Self-Regulation” by Susan Carter and Paige 
Skiba poses the fundamental question underlying most research into fringe banking: what model 
of behavior best describes the borrowing patterns of fringe banking customers? Carter and Skiba, 
in analyzing a data set proffered by a regional chain of pawn shops in Texas, found insufficient 
data to conclude that any single model of behavior best describes the activities of fringe 
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borrowers. The explanations they concerned themselves with included hyperbolic discounting, 
bounded rationality, exponential discounting, and, uniquely to their article, sentimental value. 
None of these models fit particularly well.  
All of this said, Carter and Skiba broke ground in being the first to add pawnshops to the 
discussion of hyperbolic discounting and intertemporal choice in markets. The greater body of 
economics seems to suggest that pawn loans present the lowest cost access to credit for creditless 
consumers (Zikmund-Fisher 1999) (Wilson 2010) (Washington 2006). However, the broader 
body of sociology and ethnography speaks more critically (Karger 2015) (Faber 2009). The 
research of Avery and Samolyk in their 2011 paper “Payday Loans versus Pawnshops” came to 
the conclusion that decreasing the limits on fees pawnbrokers can charge could pose a benefit to 
borrowers. Moreover, decreasing these fees would not necessarily render certain pawnshops 
unprofitable. Given the fact that there exists economies of scale at the store level, pawnbrokers 
can adjust the scale of operations and maintain certain profit margins.  
2.2 Significance 
The project studies the effect of the Economic Stimulus act of 2008 on the demand for 
pawn loans. The objective, therefore, is to assess the effect of liquidity on demand for credit. 
Evidence of such an effect would be quite difficult to reconcile with the Permanent Income 
Hypothesis and models of consumption smoothing.  
This project seeks to advance the field of economics’ knowledge of a desperately 
understudied form of finance that services tens of millions of American citizens. Specifically, the 
project looks to put to the test theories of the Permanent Income Hypothesis through analysis of 
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real-world data. Given this data is collected in the field and not in a laboratory, the findings of 
the project will hopefully prove more externally valid than those of previous studies.  
 
3. The Effect of Stimulus Payments on Pawn Loan Utilization 
3.1 Data 
 The source of the data is a chain of 10 pawn and jewelry stores located in the Midwest of 
the United States. The company has operated in this region for 28 years. The data collection, 
which is statutorily enforced by the states in which the company operates, has been consistent 
across the company’s 28 years and is standardized across the 10 locations. However, the data, 
due to storage capacity difficulties encountered when storing data proved more expensive and 
cumbersome, only extends back a decade even for those locations which were extant much 
earlier. 
 The data is comprised of three categories of variables—payment, loan, and customer. 
Inventory variables pertain to descriptions of the item which were pawned. Payment variables 
pertain to the number and amount of principal and interest payments. Loan variables pertain to 
the specifications of the loan made, specifically its due date, its principal amount, and the interest 
payments due. The customer variable pertains to customer characteristics—name, SSN, address, 
date of birth, etc.  
 As explained before, the data structure is such that the data set is composed of three 
different files: payment, loan, and customer files. For the empirical question of interest to be 
studied, these three separate files had to be merged. However, when merging these files for the 
10 stores, an error emerged such that not every loan had a valid customer file with which it could 
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be paired. The source of this error was found to be that stores three and six had improperly made 
room for extra storage by deleting the customer files of loan files which themselves were not 
deleted. For this reason, specifically that of data integrity, all observations arising from stores 
three and six were deleted. With this change made, the data merged flawlessly. For the 114 
weeks the 10 SSN groups were studied, this deletion amounted to roughly 9% of all 
observations. The resulting data set demonstrated appreciable balance as indicated in Figures 2 
and 3.  
3.2 Analysis of the Effect of Stimulus Payments on Pawn Loan Utilization 
 The primary object of interest in this project is the random variation generated by the 
disbursement of federal payments in the form of the 2008 ESPs. The project speculates that these 
payments in some way influenced the demand for pawn loans of their recipients. Perhaps it is the 
case that the provision of liquidity in the form of these payments reduced pawn loan demand for 
those customers who received them. Alternatively, it may be the case that such liquidity 
prompted profligate spending and necessitated further demand for pawn loans at a later date. To 
terse out the nature of this effect—its magnitude as well as its direction—a difference-in-
differences approach becomes necessary. Specifically, the effect of having received the ESPs for 
each group of SSNs, as indicated by the date which the check or direct deposit was sent, on the 
group’s pawn loan demand must be explored. The period of time in question is the 52 weeks 
before and after the beginning and end of the administration of ESPs to households. This 
amounts to 114 weeks in total.  
 In order to do this, our model controls for two fixed effects, that of the week and that of 
each group. The former is especially important to control for insofar as total principal 
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outstanding at each location fluctuates regularly throughout the year, peaking in the summer and 
dwindling in the winter.  
 Summarily speaking, the log of total principal outstanding for each group and week are 
regressed on two indicator variables notating whether the check or direct deposit had been sent 
for that group. Two control variables, the fixed effects for each week and the fixed effects of 
each SSN group, are included. Given this is a regression of total principal outstanding, the 
coefficients of each variable would be percentage estimates of the effect on pawn loan demand. 
This method is described in the following specification. 
                
   
   
 
                                                                       
     Number of loans disbursed to people in group g in week t 
            Dollar value of new loans disbursed to group g in week t 
 
                                                          
 
                                                                
                                                  
 
The interpretability of the coefficients of the above specification may be described as the average 
percentage change in dollars of the new loans generated by a particular group g in week t, given 
receipt of direct deposit or check in the past week. This specification describes the direction and 
magnitude of the amount of money borrowed by a pawn customer in the week following ESP 
receipt. 
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 With this interpretation in mind, the results hold that the week after an ESP is received, 
the amount of new loan dollars decreases. Specifically, receipt of an ESP check is associated 
with a 67% decrease in the amount of money borrowed. However, receipt of direct deposit 
demonstrated no significant effect on the amount of borrowing in the week after receipt of the 
ESP. 
 Furthermore, the terms of the above regression can be change such that the following is 
true: 
                                                      
                                         
 
This modification makes it such that coefficients of check and dd no longer describe the effect 
for the week following receipt of the ESP but rather for all of the remaining weeks following 
receipt of the ESP.  
 This change to the specification yields surprising results. Rather than exhibit a similar 
decrease in pawn loan utilization as reflected in the subsequent week, the regression shows a 
19% increase in dollars borrowed given receipt of a check and 138% increase given receipt of 
direct deposit (Figure 5). This is to say that the receipt of the ESP causes a decrease in pawn loan 
utilization for at least the first week, but, in the aggregate, actually increases pawn loan 
utilization. The timing of this initial decrease then increase in pawn loan utilization is explored 
with the distributed time lag regression in 3.4.  
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3.3 Analysis of the Effect of Stimulus Payments on Lagged Pawn Loan Utilization 
To better understand the timing of the effect of the submission of payment, total principal 
outstanding is regressed on a series of variables that denote with respect to each week the change 
in total principal outstanding. Utilizing this methodology, the lag of any effect of payment 
submission kicking-in could be observed. When this effect becomes significant, its direction and 
magnitude is evidenced with the following specification. The coefficients of the lagged weeks 
reflect point estimates of the effect of having received an ESP that many lagged weeks before or 
after. 
                               
 
    
             
                                       
When the above distributed lag regression is performed, while omitting those weeks one and two 
weeks before receipt of the ESP, and studying all of those weeks between three weeks before and 
ten weeks after the receipt of the ESP, a pattern consistent with the one in section 3.3 is 
observed. Specifically, the receipt of an ESP is associated with an initial decrease in pawn loan 
utilization. It even appears that this decrease in pawn loan utilization actually precedes receipt of 
the ESP. That is to say that the mere expectation of ESP receipt leads would be pawn customers 
to avoid, or at the very least, delay their borrowing. However, this initial decrease in borrowing 
is not significant within the distributed time lag regression itself (Figure 6). 
That effect which proves to be statistically significant is the increase in pawn loan 
utilization which occurs in weeks three and four. Having received the ESP three or four weeks 
before amounts to an increase in pawn loan utilization of roughly 32%. Though the positive 
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magnitude of the effect of ESP receipt on pawn loan utilization persists through the rest of the 
time period, its statistical significance does not. 
To summarize, the distributed lag regression demonstrates an effect consistent with that 
of 3.3. That is to say that the receipt of the ESP brings with it a small initial decrease in pawn 
loan utilization which is then dominated by a much more severe and significant increase in pawn 
loan utilization. 
 It may also be the case that changes in pawn loan demand due to federal payment 
submission vary according to certain observable characteristics of the borrowers. Most literature 
pertaining to the effect of ESPs on households pays particular mind to the heterogeneity of 
household characteristics in explaining their responses to ESP receipt. Such characteristics could 
potentially be whether or not the customer is new, the customers’ history of redemption, gender, 
age, etc. Utilizing the full scope of the data set, the influence of these characteristics on pawn 
loan demand given the increased liquidity provided by the federal payments, could be explored. 
A difference in differences approach, similar to the one above, using any one of these 
characteristics as an indicator variable, could be suitably employed. Doing so will provide the 
project with a more detailed and comprehensive grasp of the effect of ESPs on pawn customers. 
4. Discussion 
 This behavior of pawn customers to initially decrease then drastically increase pawn loan 
utilization after receipt of the 2008 ESPs is very difficult to reconcile with the Permanent 
Income/Life Cycle Hypothesis. The effect illustrated here demonstrates, in a manner consistent 
with other literature pertaining to the 2008 ESPs, the capacity of transitory changes in short-term 
income to change consumption and borrowing patterns.  
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 However, to explain why it is the case that pawn customers counterintuitively initially 
decrease then increase pawn loan utilization requires speculation.  
 The existing literature demonstrates that a majority of ESPs were spent on the purchase 
of durable goods (Kaplan and Violante 2013). Moreover, ESPs increased household 
consumption in the short run. Some even suggest that the receipt of the ESPs motivated some 
households composed of women, families, and hourly workers, to reduce their labor supply. 
These notions in mind, the following narrative for the effect of ESP receipt on pawn loan 
utilization demonstrated in this paper may be suggested (Powell 2014; Broda and Parker 2014). 
 Pawn customers are liquidity-constrained. The receipt of the ESP engenders liquidity and 
reduces the need of the customer to borrow to make ends meet. Effectively, the customer’s short-
run pawn loan utilization is diminished. The customer who receives this ESP spends much of it 
on durable goods, and increases his or her rate of consumption. This customer may even be 
motivated to work less and decrease their income. With a pattern of increased consumption and 
diminished income established, the customer soon finds his or herself in financial trouble and 
once more faces the need to utilize the emergency credit offered by the pawn lender. The 
customer’s ability to do this is bolstered by his or her newfound possession of new durable goods 
that command a higher principal amount when borrowed against. Effectively, the customer’s 
pawn loan utilization is increased in the year following ESP receipt. 
 The veracity of this narrative may be tested through exploration of customer 
heterogeneity. An association with above-average response to ESP receipt of women or hourly 
workers in the data set, or a change in the composition of pawned items would bolster the 
validity of this speculative explanation. 
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Figure 1: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dates of Payments
SSN # Check sentDeposit sentg
00-09 16-May 2-May 1
10-18 23-May 2-May 2
19-20 30-May 2-May 3
21-25 30-May 9-May 4
26-38 6-Jun 9-May 5
39-51 13-Jun 9-May 6
52-63 20-Jun 9-May 7
64-75 27-Jun 9-May 8
76-87 4-Jul 16-May 9
88-99 11-Jul 16-May 10
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Figure 2: 
Summary Statistics 
          
 
g1 g2 g3 g4 g5 g6 g7 g8 g9 g10 
Loan Amount ($) 79.30 82.79 77.00 76.41 87.31 89.39 88.63 88.80 92.28 85.24 
 
(136.85) (125.99) (100.22) (93.44) (171.91) (163.59) (158.05) (207.99) (258.75) (155.97) 
Interest Payment ($) 15.85 16.55 15.40 15.28 17.46 17.88 17.72 17.76 18.04 17.04 
 
(27.37) (25.20) (20.04) (18.69) (34.40) (32.73) (31.61) (41.61) (48.16) (31.20) 
Active Pawns 0.19 0.16 0.29 0.14 0.24 0.16 0.25 0.26 0.21 0.21 
 
(0.70) (0.60) (0.74) (0.50) (0.92) (0.63) (0.70) (0.91) (0.80) (0.80) 
Total Number of Pawns 33.69 40.69 35.70 33.97 43.25 35.88 79.92 42.28 45.37 39.33 
 
(41.48) (58.04) (45.98) (49.30) (81.59) (53.06) (170.45) (68.58) (73.40) (55.41) 
Total Pawn Amount ($) 2113.10 2634.52 2079.30 2039.90 2457.26 2505.19 3394.40 2380.26 2649.34 2493.77 
 
(2930.7) (3775.1) (2853.3) (3116.6) (3618.3) (3875.8) (5300.1) (3332.9) (3961.8) (3526.1) 
Redeemed Pawns 25.33 30.78 26.86 24.93 34.30 27.23 67.88 33.71 34.85 30.71 
 
(34.24) (47.11) (35.88) (35.81) (69.78) (44.35) (156.14) (60.01) (61.16) (46.36) 
Forfeited Pawns 8.11 9.70 8.54 8.84 8.62 8.39 12.65 8.30 10.21 8.37 
 
(161.11) (135.66) (68.14) (74.11) (195.96) (971.42) (143.13) (95.02) (142.00) (161.09) 
Average Pawn Amount 
($) 79.66 80.30 78.53 78.29 87.29 92.65 88.03 86.71 88.89 84.05 
 
(124.62) (94.14) (81.59) (89.30) (129.98) (199.75) (140.23) (206.01) (205.06) (129.07) 
Average Pawn Term 53.19 55.65 53.42 54.23 51.27 52.65 47.75 51.13 47.90 51.56 
 
(67.94) (67.76) (72.00) (75.77) (71.31) (72.40) (68.14) (66.40) (58.43) (67.01) 
Redemption Ratio 62.98 62.53 61.31 60.76 60.72 61.03 64.20 62.53 61.56 63.29 
 
(30.94) (30.09) (32.41) (31.00) (32.74) (31.66) (30.60) (31.00) (30.98) (31.29) 
N 5602 5020 970 2779 6749 6834 6954 6371 6880 6447 
           SSN Digits 10 9 2 5 13 13 12 12 12 12 
N/SSN Digits 560.2 557.78 485 555.8 519.15 525.69 579.5 530.92 573.33 537.25 
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Figure 3: 
Output of g regressed on Log New Loans ($). 
 
Coefficient Std. Err. p-value 
g1 N/A N/A N/A 
g2 0.0087556 0.033654 0.795 
g3 -0.047853 0.033727 0.156 
g4 -0.023157 0.033654 0.492 
g5 0.040072 0.033654 0.234 
g6 0.0479421 0.033654 0.155 
g7 0.0270895 0.033654 0.421 
g8 0.0322293 0.033654 0.338 
g9 0.0113653 0.033654 0.736 
g10 0.0314158 0.033654 0.351 
 
Figure 3.1: 
Regressions Specifications for balance 
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Figure 4: 
Regression panel of the week after effects of receipt of the ESP. 
 
 
Coefficient Std. Err. P-Value 
I(check)  -0.671332  0.122585  .000 
I(direct deposit)  0.0148652  0.133927  .702  
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Figure 5: 
Regression panel of all remaining weeks following receipt of the ESP 
 
Coefficient Std. Err. P-Value 
I(check)  0.1938898  0.069316  .005  
I(direct deposit)  1.385456  0.159253  .000 
    
 
 
 
 
-4
-2
0
2
R
e
s
id
u
a
ls
5 6 7 8 9
Fitted values
Block 23 
 
Figure 6: 
Distributed Lag Regression 
 
 
 
 
Note: Each figure plots the point estimates from a regression of pawn loan utilization in dollars 
described in 3.4. Dotted lines plot 95% confidence intervals. These intervals are robust to any 
autocorrelation that may arise due to observations coming from the same SSN group.  
As described in 3.4, this distributed lag regression controls for any week and group fixed effects 
including an indicator for receipt of direct deposit. The omitted time period includes the weeks zero and 
one weeks before the receipt of the ESP. 
 
